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Regional allocation of investment might lead to high rates of aggregate growth accompanied with unequal d istribution of income 
across regions and vice versa. This issue can be tackled using the theory of optimal control. The necessary conditions for an 
optimal allocation policy are developed in this paper. 
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Regional policy normally has both an ‘efficiency’ and ‘equity’ component – that is, it is concerned with 
stimulating growth in the economy as a whole and with narrowing interregional disparities. Most policy decisions 
attempt to promote both economic growth and redistribution in favour of less prosperous regions. These aims, 
however, may contradict each other. Indeed, maximising national income may do nothing towards reducing regional 
income differentials. The main thesis of this paper is that the two aims may be compatible rather than competitive. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. A model of ‘regional allocation of investment’ is presented in section 
2. Section 3 is devoted to the estimation of the switching time. Section 4 studies the implications of the model. 
Section 5 offers some conclusions.
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     Rahman (1963) put forward the idea that it is possible to obtain maximum national income by a regional 
allocation of investment. Specifically, the problem is how to allocate total savings among two regions1 at each point 
in time in such a way that the economy as a whole acquires a predetermined level of income. An obvious decision is 
to invest in the more productive region. Investing in a low productivity region, however, is also optimal, provided 
that this region exhibits a relatively high propensity to save. The analysis by Rahman (1963) runs in terms of a 
sequential discrete decision process frequently referred to as ‘ ’. According to this 
principle, if initial decisions are taken, the remaining decisions must be optimal with respect to the ‘status’ resulting 
from the initial decisions in order for the entire set of decisions to be optimal (Bellman, 1959). Similar conclusions, 
however, can be derived following the principles of Optimal Control Theory (hereafter OCT). Indeed, advances in 
OCT offer the opportunity for a more sophisticated analysis (Intriligator, 1964). Consider an economy with two 
regions. Each region produces a homogenous output ( ), which is proportional to the regional capital stock ( ):  
, 2,1 , with 0                                                                           (1)
     Equation (1) is a constant returns production function2, where is the (fixed) output-capital ratio (capital 
coefficient). Essentially, this approach draws upon the neoclassical model of growth. Some brief comments on the 
assumptions pertain this model will set the scene for what follows. To begin with, total (national) savings ( ) are 
automatically invested ( ): while a constant proportion of output is saved: , where is the 
propensity to save. Assuming a (constant) regionally invariant rate of depreciation, the rate of fixed capital 
formation ( / ) equals investment: . Assuming identical regional production functions, then 
222111 . Provided that 21 , then 221121 , where . The term 
can be interpreted as the (constant) growth rate of each region. A final assumption is in order. The investment 
fund for the two regions comes from the savings available to the economy as a whole. Total savings are polled in a 
central agency and then allocated to only one region. This assumption can be encapsulated in the ‘allocation 
parameter’ , defined as the proportion of savings allocated to region 1, leaving )1( as the proportion allocated 
to region 2. Therefore,    
)( 22111                                                    (2)
))(1( 22112                                      (3)
      Equations (2) and (3), the ‘equations of motion’, describe the evolution of the ‘state variables’ ( ) as a 
function of the ‘decisions’ taken at any point in time, reflected by the ‘control variable’, . Following the
assumption that capital once placed in either region cannot shifted from the other region, then a continuous is 
implied for which 10 . The aim is to obtain maximum national income at a terminal time ( ). More formally, 
the problem at hand is to maximise )()()( 21 , given equations (2), (3) and the restriction 10 . 
Thus, )( . This problem can be solved by determining an optimal time path of , or alternatively, to choose 
a )( sequence which maximizes the associated Hamiltonian function: 2211 , where denote the 
auxiliary (co-state) variables, which can be interpreted as the ‘shadow’ price of capital or the price of one additional 
unit of capital in each region. Using equations (2) and (3), the Hamiltonian function is written as
))(1()( 2211222111 or )]()([ 2211221 . Given the optimal 
solution is either 0)(* or 1)(* 3 . If 1)(* , then 02 and region 1 receives the funds. 
Conversely, 0)(* implies that 01 and the funds are allocated in region 2. In order to arrive at transparent 
conclusions, an investment criterion is necessary. Hence, 1)(* if 0)()( 21 ; 0)(
* if 
0)()( 21 ; in words, this states that the funds are allocated to the region in which the ‘shadow’ price of 
1 Considering an economy with two regions is not uncommon in the relevant literature (e.g. Michel et al, 1983). Similar models, however, were 
developed in a multiregional context (e.g. Ohtsuki, 1971).   
2 Equation (1) can be derived from a Cobb-Douglas production function: 1 or , where / is labour productivity and 
/ denotes the capital-labour ratio . In logarithmic terms this production function can be written as loglog ; an expression 
equivalent to  equation (1). 
3 This solution is referred to  as a typical ‘bang-bang’ control. See also Smith (1970).
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capital is higher. Following the ‘Maximum Principle’ the optimality conditions require that the ad-joint (co-state) 
equations, 11 / and 22 / must hold, and satisfy the transversality (terminal) conditions: 
)(/)()( 11 and )(/)()( 22 . 
1. If )( is a decreasing function of time, then 2121 // . 
: The ad-joint equations 12211 ])([ and 22212 ])([ imply that 
2121 // .                                                                                                                                                     Q.E.D.
2. At , ]/))[(()()( 221221 . 
: Differentiating the state equation ))](()([/ 221121 , with respect the time yields 
))](()([))((/)/( 221121221121 . In steady-state 0 , implying 
))((/)/( 221121 . Setting 0/)/( yields 0))(( 221121 . Moreover, 
0/ implies 0))](()([ 221121 . Since 0/)/(/ , it follows that
))(())](()([ 221121221121 . Consequently, )()( 2121 . Using Lemma 1,
the following relation can be obtained ]/)[()( 221221 . Provided that )()( 2121 , then 
]/))[(()()( 221221 .                                                                                                                     Q.E.D.
3. At , )(]/)[()()( 222121 . 
: The terminal conditions imply 11 )( and 22 )( . Therefore, 2121 /)(/)( and 
)(]/)[()()( 222121 .                                                                                                                   Q.E.D.
Propositions 1 and 2 set out the maximising conditions over a planning period, let ]0[ .  
1. At 0 , 1)(* if 21 while 0)(
* if 21 . 
: By Lemma 2, if 21 then 0)()( 21 implying 1)(
* while 21 implies 0)()( 21 , 
and 0)(* .                                                                                                                                                        Q.E.D.
2. At , 1)(* if 21 while 0)(
* if 21 . 
: According to Lemma 3, if 21 then 0)()( 21 implying 1)(
* while 21 implies 
0)()( 21 , and 0)(
* .                                                             Q.E.D.
     The optimal allocation policy is to invest initially in the region with the higher growth rate and at the end of the 
planning period to allocate the funds only in the region with the higher output-capital ratio. Assume that 021
and 021 . In this case, 1)(
* , ]0[ . Suppose that 021 , 021 and 021 , then 
]0[,0)(* .  
3. If 1/ 21 and 1/ 21 , then ]0[,1)(
* .
: Proposition 1 implies that 1)(* at 0 if 1/ 21 , while according to Proposition 2, 1)(
* at 
if 1/ 21 .                                                                                      Q.E.D.
4. If 1/ 21 and 1/ 21 , then ]0[,0)(
* .
: According to Proposition 1, if 1/ 21 , 0)(
* at 0 . Following Proposition 2 0)(* at , 
if 1/ 21 .                                                                                          Q.E.D.
     Assume that 021 and 021 , implying that 021 . According to Proposition 1, 1)(
* at 
0 and region 1 receives the funds. At , given the difference in capital coefficients 0)(* and 
investment takes place in region 2. Irrespective of the productivity advantage of region 1, 021 and 
021 ensures that 0)(
* at 0 . At , 1)(* , given that  021 and funds are transferred 
to region 1. The ‘switching’ sequence can be described by Propositions 5 and 6. 
5. If 1/ 21 and 1/ 21 , then 1)(
* at 0 and 0)(* at .
: By Proposition 1, at 0 if 1/ 21 , then 1)(
* while Proposition 2  implies 0)(* at , 
if 1/ 21 .                                                                                             Q.E.D.
6. If 1/ 21 and 1/ 21 , then 0)(
* at 0 and 1)(* at .
: By Proposition 1, if 1/ 21 , then 0)(
* at 0 while if 1/ 21 , then 1)(
* at , 
according to Proposition 2.                                                                                                                                   Q.E.D.
     According to Propositions 5 and 6, a negative relation between )( 212,1 and )( 212,1 implies a 
switch in . This inverse relation carries important implications for regional policy. For the present purpose, 
though, there is another point that deserves special note. It is of particular interest to estimate the switching time of 
the allocation parameter. This is examined in Section 3. 
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    From what has been said in section 2, it is clear that OCT is applicable to the problem of regional allocation of 
investment4. Intriligator (1964) suggests a ‘switch’ in the allocation parameter. Just how long such a switch would 
take place, however, was not specified. This constitutes the departure point for a more elaborated analysis by 
Takayama (1967). Defining )]()(/[)]()([)(/)( 221121 and using the terminal conditions yields 
)()()()( 12221 , where 221 /)( , 221 /                            (4)
Given that 0 , then 0 . If 21 and 12 , then 21 , implying 1
* . If 21 , investment takes  
place in the more productive region while 21 implies that the funds are transferred to the region with the highest 
propensity to save. If 21 and 012 , then 0 and 0)( 12 , implying 21 ; hence, 1
* . 
Assuming that 21 and 12 , then 0 , 0)( 12 and 21 ; in this case remains unchanged. If 
21 and 21 , then 0
*
2 . Suppose that 21 ; hence, 2
*
2 , while if 12 , then 2
*
2 . A switch in 
the allocation parameter takes place if 21 . If 12 , then 2
*
2 . But 21 and 21 imply 21 ; 
beyond *21 , therefore, 21 and 1 ; then, there is a point ][ 0
* , where *22 )( . If 
*
0 , then 
1)(* at *0 and 0)(
* at * .  
4. If 21 and 21 , then 212121
*
2 )]/()[( . 
: The conditions 21 and 012 , imply 0 and 0)( 12 . Equation (5) implies 
)()/( 122211 . Setting 21 , yields 212121
*
2 )]/()[( .                                             Q.E.D.
7. A switch in occurs at )]/()log[(/1 211212
* . 
: By Lemma 1 22212 ])([ . Setting 0 yields 222 . This is a differential equation 
with the solution )(2 2)( . At , )(2 and 
)(
22
2)()( . By Lemma 3, 22 )( . Thus, 
)-(
22
2)( . Setting *22 )( and using Lemma 4, 212121
)(
2 )]/()[(2 . Solving for yields
)]/()log[(/1 211212
* .                                                                                                                 Q.E.D.
    Assume that planners decide to implement an allocation policy in order to increase national income (efficiency). 
As previously, the economy consists of two regions. In addition assume a level of interregional inequalities, 
established in a previous period )0[ 0 . In order to have a concrete vocabulary the ‘gap’ in regional incomes is 
defined as 0)( 02,1 , where )()()()( 020102,102,1
5. Let 021 and 021 . The optimal 
policy, at 0 , is ][,1 0
* and investment takes place exclusively in region 16. Arguably, while national 
income increases as , 0/ . The ‘gap’ in regional incomes also follows a similar trend, 0/2,1 . 
This policy maximises national income, )()( with )()( 0 . An increase, however, in regional 
income disparities is also evident, i.e. )()( 2,12,1 with )()( 02,12,1 . A by-product of this policy is that 
region 1 retains its advantage and grows at the expense of the poor region. The switch in the allocation parameter at 
, when 021 and 021 , results to maximum output and a reduction of regional inequalities
Specifically, 0/ ][ 0 in conjunction with 0/2,1 )[
*
0 and 
0/2,1 ][
* . A ‘mirror image’ case emerges if 021 and 021 . According to the 
optimality conditions a change in the allocation parameter ( 0)(* at 0 and 1)(* at ) takes 
place, leading to a reduction of regional inequalities at 0 , followed by a widening of the income gap at the 
end of the period. When the relatively ‘poor’ region, however, exhibits relatively higher rate of growth and the 
productivity of capital is relatively higher in this region, the solution 0)(* ][ 0 , enables planners to 
achieve both equity and efficiency.      
4 Rahman (1966), however, casts a sceptical view and claims that this is feasible only if 1 .
5 Assuming 0)(
02,1
will not alter the main conclusions of the model. 
6 Similarly, the funds are allocated to  region 2, if 0)(
02,1
, 
21
< and 
21
< ; in this case 0=* , ][
0
.
TptpTptptptp
sstptptp vv
iv ss pp ssvv
ss ss pp
ss ss pp
ss p vv vp vv vp
vv vv vp vv ss
pp pp Ttt ptp tt
t ttt t Ttt
Lemma ss vvssp
Proof ss ss
sspp pp vvssp         
Proposition vssTt
Proof pppp pp
tTAetp Tt ATp tTeTptp vTp
tTevtp ptp vvssev tT t
vssTt
t
tG tYtYtYtG vv
t Ttt
Tt tYN tGTYtY NN tYTY NN
TGtG tGTG
Tt vv
tYN Ttt tG ttttG Ttt vv
t Tt t Tt
Tt
t Ttt
tG
tG vv ?? d Ttt
3. The Switching Time   
4. Implications for Regional Policy 
. 
−−=
−+=− −= =
> > > > > = =
=
= >− = >− > =
> = > =− >
> > < = = > >
< < < > > >
= > = ∈ = <
= <≤ = ≤≤
> > −−=
> <− > <−
−=− = −−=
−−−=
+−−= = −=
−
= = =
−
= =
= = −−=−
−−−=
> −≡Δ≡ >− >−
∈∀=
→ >∂∂ >∂∂
→ >
→ >
= >− <−
>∂∂ ∈∀ >∂∂ ∈∀
<∂∂ ∈∀ <− >−
= <≤ = =
<≤
= ∈∀
=
=
<
&&
K
& &
K
K
K K
K
K
K
rq gggq gr
r gg d
gg q r d
gg q r d
gg
gg
d
d d
gg gg
gg q r
rgg gg
d ggg
gd d g
g g
g ggg
ggg
gg
d
gg
gg
d d
d
d
??
180   Stilianos Alexiadis /  Procedia Economics and Finance  9 ( 2014 )  176 – 180 
An aggregate efficiency and regional equity component is normally involved in the design of regional policies. 
Nevertheless, these might contradict each other, given that maximising aggregate efficiency may increase regional 
income differentials; a topic that appears to be attracting increasing attention and interest amongst policy-making 
bodies. This paper provides a set of choices that may assist policy-makers to design optimal regional policies. 
Hence, there is a need to rethink regional policies along the lines of the implementation of more innovative and 
region-specific development strategies, based on the concept of optimality in decision-making.
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